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Abstract
This paper argues that, for Bernard Nieuwentijt (1654–1718), mathematical reasoning
on the basis of ideas is not the same as logical reasoning on the basis of propositions.
Noting that the two types of reasoning differ helps make sense of a peculiar-sounding
claim Nieuwentijt makes, namely that it is possible to mathematically deduce false
propositions from true abstracted ideas. I propose to interpret Nieuwentijt’s abstracted
ideas as incomplete mental copies of existing objects. I argue that, according to
Nieuwentijt, a proposition is mathematically deducible from an abstracted idea if
it can be demonstrated that that proposition makes a true claim about the object that
idea forms. This allows me to explain why Nieuwentijt deems it possible to deduce
false propositions from true ideas. It also implies that logic and mathematics are not
as closely related for Nieuwentijt as has been suggested in the existing secondary
literature.
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1 Introduction
In his 1720 work on the nature of pure and mixed mathematics, Grounds of Certainty1
(Gronden van zekerheid), the Dutch philosopher Bernard Nieuwentijt suggests that
he regards logic and mathematics as intimately related. In a chapter that is concerned
with logic, Nieuwentijt claims to show “[…] that true Logicians […] only differ from
the true Mathematicians in the outer Ways [uiterlyke Omstandigheden] of expressing
1 Translation adopted fromDucheyne (2007). Throughout this paper, I use GC as abbreviation for Grounds
of Certainty (i.e. Nieuwentijt 1720), and use it to give references to page numbers of this work.
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their proofs, yet not at all in the force of Arguments”2 (GC, p. 218). He also claims to
show that “[…] the true mathematicians agree with the logicians, and do not funda-
mentally differ [in den gront niet verschillen]”3 (GC, p. 204). Nieuwentijt’s remarks
have led Ducheyne (2017b, p. 287n.) to claim that Nieuwentijt regards logic as a
part of pure mathematics. Petry suggests that mixed mathematics forms, to a certain
extent, a “branch of logic” (1979, p. 6) for Nieuwentijt.4 Beth (1954, pp. 451–452)
even compares Nieuwentijt’s position to logicism.
In this paper, I argue that Nieuwentijt does not identify mathematical reasoning
with logical reasoning, and that the existing accounts of his views on the relationship
between logic and mathematics cannot be correct. In his analysis of the nature of
mixed mathematics, Nieuwentijt claims that it is possible to mathematically deduce
false propositions from true abstracted ideas.5 An abstracted idea of an object is an
idea that represents some, but not all of that object’s properties.6 If, in Nieuwen-
tijt’s eyes, mathematically deducing propositions from true abstracted ideas would be
the same as logically deducing propositions from true propositions, then his claim
would be a very odd one. As Nieuwentijt himself emphasizes, it is not his view that
we can logically deduce false propositions from true premises. In fact, the point of
Nieuwentijt’s discussion of logic in Grounds of Certainty is to stress this. There is
no disagreement between the mathematicians and the logicians, Nieuwentijt explains,
because the mathematicians accept that a proposition that is logically deduced from
true premises must be true as well (GC, pp. 214–216). This does not mean that math-
ematical reasoning is the same as logical reasoning according to Nieuwentijt, on the
contrary. Nieuwentijt characterizes mathematical reasoning as the examination and
comparison of ideas. Both in pure and in mixed mathematics we can discover truths
bymathematically deducing propositions from ideas. As I show in this paper, deducing
propositions from ideas is something different from logically deducing propositions
from other propositions for Nieuwentijt. According to Nieuwentijt, ideas allow us to
deduce truths that cannot be deduced logically.
This paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 shows that Nieuwentijt’s claim that it is
possible to deduce false propositions from true abstracted ideaswouldbeproblematic if
he identifiedmathematical deduction on the basis of ideaswith logical deduction on the
basis of propositions. Section 3 considers what it means to deduce a proposition from
ideas by analyzing Nieuwentijt’s views on pure mathematics. We see that, according
to Nieuwentijt, we deduce a proposition from ideas by showing that that proposition
makes a true claim about these ideas. In Sect. 4, I analyze Nieuwentijt’s notion of
2 “[…] dat ware Logici […] alleen in de uiterlyke Omstandigheden van haar bewysen uit te drukken, dog
geensints in de kragt der Betogingen, van de ware Mathematici verschillen”.
3 “[…] de ware mathematici met de logici overeenkomen, en in den gront niet verschillen”.
4 Petry uses the term ‘applied mathematics’ instead of ‘mixed mathematics’.
5 I translateNieuwentijt’s term ‘voorstel’ as ‘proposition’. Note that Nieuwentijt’s use of the term ‘voorstel’
diverges somewhat from our ordinary use of ‘proposition’. As becomes clear in the course of this paper,
Nieuwentijt believes that one and the same proposition can have different truth values, because it can be
regarded as speaking of an existing object, but also as speaking of an idea of an existing object.
6 Nieuwentijt’s views on abstracted ideas are discussed by Beth (1954, pp. 449–451) and Ducheyne (2007,




an abstracted idea. I show that, given a specific interpretation of this notion, and
Nieuwentijt’s conception of mathematical reasoning, it makes sense for him to claim
that it is possible to deduce false propositions from true abstracted ideas. In Sect. 5, I
explain howmathematical reasoningon the basis of ideas differs from logical reasoning
in Nieuwentijt’s thinking. We see that whether or not a proposition is mathematically
deducible from ideas is determined by these ideas, according to Nieuwentijt. Whether
a proposition can be logically deduced from other propositions, by contrast, does not
rely on ideas. We see that Nieuwentijt is implicitly committed to a view that Macbeth
(2017) ascribes to Descartes, namely the view that mathematical truths have a different
type of necessity than logical truths.
2 The problem
As Ducheyne (2007, p. 704) has pointed out, Nieuwentijt uses his notion of an
abstracted idea to provide an early account of the use of idealization and abstraction
in science.7 Nieuwentijt observes that scientists often derive conclusions by neglect-
ing specific aspects of the phenomena they study. Such conclusions are certainly true
under specific idealized circumstances,Nieuwentijt points out, but theymay not be true
under normal circumstances (cf. Ducheyne 2007, pp. 704–707; 2017b, pp. 288–289).
Put in our terms, Nieuwentijt notes that many scientific claims are true ceteris paribus
only (cf. Ducheyne 2017b, pp. 288–289).8 Nieuwentijt makes this point by arguing
that scientists, or mixedmathematicians, tend to reason on the basis of abstracted ideas
of the existing objects they study. For Nieuwentijt, an idea of an object is adequate
if it represents or “shows” (vertoont) all of that object’s properties (GC, p. 44). An
abstracted or “subtracted”9 (afgetrokken) idea is an idea that represents some, but not
all of its object’s properties (GC, p. 45).10 Scientists or mixed mathematicians who
neglect the influence of air resistance on some phenomenon, for instance, reason on
the basis of abstracted ideas, in Nieuwentijt’s eyes (e.g. GC, pp. 64–65; cf. Ducheyne
2007, pp. 704–707; 2017b, p. 289). According to Nieuwentijt, a proposition that is
deduced from an abstracted idea of an existing object would certainly be true if that
existing object had no properties other than those the abstracted idea represents (GC,
p. 63). However, because the object typically does have other properties, the deduced
propositions may be false. Nieuwentijt claims that even if the abstracted ideas on the
basis of which mixed mathematicians reason are true, propositions that are deduced
from them may be false (e.g. GC, p. 74). If Nieuwentijt equated the mathematical
7 See also Ducheyne (2007, 2017b, esp. pp. 286–295) for discussions of Nieuwentijt’s views on abstraction
and of the role of abstraction in Nieuwentijt’s wider philosophical project.
8 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer who proposed to clarify Nieuwentijt’s position in these
terms. See e.g. Cartwright, who characterizes ceteris paribus generalizations as “generalizations that hold
under special conditions, usually ideal conditions” (Cartwright 1983, p. 45). Note that I do not wish to
suggest that it is Nieuwentijt’s view that all scientific knowledge consists of lawlike statements.
9 Translation adopted from Ducheyne (2007). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting to refer to
these ideas as ‘abstracted’ ideas. Cf. also Ducheyne (2017a, b).
10 See also Ducheyne (2007, pp. 704–705; 2017a, section 2; b, p. 228) for discussion of Nieuwentijt’s
notion of an abstracted idea.
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deduction from ideas with logical deduction from propositions, this claim would be
problematic. We see this when we consider what it means for propositions to be true,
in Nieuwentijt’s eyes, and what this means for abstracted ideas.
Nieuwentijt’s discussion of abstraction forms part of his analysis of the nature of
mixed or “factual” (sakelyke)11 mathematics. According to Nieuwentijt, mixed math-
ematics differs from pure or “imaginary” (denkbeeldige)12 mathematics, because it
aims to provide knowledge of existing things (wesentlyke saken).13 To obtain such
knowledge, it must base its results not just on reason, but also on empirical data or
“experiences” (ondervindingen), Nieuwentijt argues. In pure mathematics we obtain
knowledge independently from sensory experience, by reasoning on the basis of
so-called “bare ideas”14 (blote denkbeelden), according to Nieuwentijt.15 Pure math-
ematicians reason on the basis of ideas of mathematical objects such as triangles and
circles, without verifying whether these ideas correspond to any existing entities.16
For this reason, these ideas are nothing but ideas or “bare” ideas, in Nieuwentijt’s eyes.
Pure mathematics as such cannot discover truths about existing objects, Nieuwentijt
argues. It can only discover truths about bare ideas themselves (GC, pp. 21–22).17
In the next section we consider what exactly bare ideas are, and what it means for
propositions to be true of such ideas.
Unlike pure mathematicians, mixed mathematicians seek to form ideas that cor-
respond to existing things, so-called “factual ideas” (sakelyke denkbeelden, e.g. GC,
p. 40), Nieuwentijt argues. They do so by basing their ideas on experimental data or
“grounding experiences” (grond-ondervindingen) of existing objects (GC, p. 40; cf.
Beth 1954, p. 449; Ducheyne 2017a, section 2; b, p. 287). By reasoning on the basis
of these ideas, mixed mathematicians deduce new claims about the objects they study
(GC, pp. 48–51; cf. Beth 1954, pp. 449–451). Only if these claims are confirmed by
further empirical data or “test experiences” (proef -ondervindingen) can we accept
them as true, Nieuwentijt argues. More precisely, only then can we accept them as
what Nieuwentijt calls “factually true” (sakelyk waar, e.g. GC, pp. 214, 131) (see GC,
pp. 80–81; cf. Beth 1954, pp. 450–451; Ducheyne 2007, pp. 705–706).
Nieuwentijt distinguishes two ways in which a proposition (voorstel) that makes a
claim about existing objects can be true (cf. Ducheyne 2007, pp. 705–706). Proposi-
11 Translation adopted from Ducheyne (2007).
12 Translation adopted from Beth (1954), Petry (1979) and Ducheyne (2007, 2017a, b).
13 By “existing things” (wesentlyke saken) Nieuwentijt means entities that exist at some point in time, not
only presently exiting entities (GC, p. 28).
14 I thank Jonathan Shaheen for suggesting this translation.
15 See alsoBeth (1954, pp. 448, 451–452),Ducheyne (2007, pp. 702–704; 2017a, section 2; b, pp. 286–287),
Vermij (1991, p. 84) and Petry (1979, p. 5) for discussions of Nieuwentijt’s views on pure mathematics.
Vermij (1989, esp. pp. 82–83) and Ducheyne (2017b, pp. 275–279; 287) also point to some interesting
developments in Nieuwentijt’s views on the topic.
16 Nieuwentijt himself is agnostic as to whether such things as mathematical points or mathematical lines
could exist (GC, pp. 5–6). Other mathematical entities, such as quantities with more than three dimensions,
certainly cannot exist, Nieuwentijt argues (GC, pp. 7–8; cf. Beth 1954, p. 448).
17 Because some bare ideas may correspond to existing objects, pure mathematics can indirectly teach us
things about existing objects, according to Nieuwentijt (cf. GC, p. 25). However, whether ideas correspond
to existing entities can only be established in mixed mathematics (GC, p. 26). Thanks to an anonymous
reviewer for raising questions regarding this issue.
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tions that we would normally call true are “factually true” or, as Nieuwentijt also puts
it, true “in” (in, e.g. GC, p. 63) an existing thing. A proposition is factually true if it
makes a claim about existing objects, and the existing objects it speaks of have the
properties that the proposition ascribes to them (GC, pp. 51–52). Propositions can also
be true “with respect to” (in opsigt van, e.g. GC, pp. 63, 65) or “in” (in, e.g. pp. 65, 66,
71, 74) abstracted ideas of existing objects. In Sect. 4, we consider what it means for
propositions to be true with respect to abstracted ideas. For now, the important point
is that it is Nieuwentijt’s view that propositions that are mathematically deduced from
abstracted ideas are certainly true with respect to these ideas. However, they may not
be factually true, or true “in” the existing objects represented by these ideas, he claims
(e.g. GC, pp. 63–65; 66–67; 74–75; cf. Beth 1954, p. 450; Ducheyne 2007, p. 706).
The propositions that mixed mathematicians deduce from ideas of existing objects
need to be confirmed by sensory data, according to Nieuwentijt, because these ideas
are almost always abstracted.
Nieuwentijt not only distinguishes between two ways in which propositions can be
true. In addition, he suggests that there are two types of entities that can have truth
values, namely propositions and ideas. An idea that represents an existing object or
a property of an existing object is true, Nieuwentijt states, if “it shows us either the
Thing, or a Property that is in the thing, Truly”18 (GC, p. 44; cf. Ducheyne 2007,
pp. 704–705). Ideas are false if they “show something to us, that Truly is not in the
Thing”19 (GC, p. 44). Abstracted ideas form incomplete representations of existing
objects, but they can nevertheless be true of these objects according to Nieuwentijt,
or at least true in some sense.
Although Nieuwentijt ascribes truth values to abstracted ideas, he does not appear
to assign a propositional character to them. Although this is not how Nieuwentijt
expresses his point himself, it seems that it is not so much an idea that can be true or
false in his eyes, but rather the implicit judgment wemake in assuming that an existing
object or its properties conform to an idea.20 Nieuwentijt only specifies what it means
to be true and false for the “factual” ideas that mixed mathematicians form of existing
objects (GC, p. 44). The bare ideas on the basis of which pure mathematicians reason
appear to have no truth value.21 Presumably, an idea of a property of existing objects,
such as that of two-hundred-meters-high has, as such, no truth value either. However,
by assuming that this idea corresponds to the height of, for instance, a specific existing
tower, we implicitly form the judgment that that tower is two-hundred meters high. I
take it to be Nieuwentijt’s view that the idea of two-hundred-meters-high forms a true
abstracted idea of the existing tower precisely if this judgment is true.
One might expect that what Nieuwentijt describes as reasoning on the basis of true
abstracted ideas consists in reasoning on the basis of the true implicit judgments that
arise by assuming that these ideas correspond to features of existing objects. However,
18 “als het aan ons of de Saak, of een Eigenschap die in de Saak is, Waarlyk vertoont”.
19 “iets aan ons vertonen, dat Waarlyk in de saak niet is”.
20 This is roughly Descartes’s position in the Third Meditation (see AT VII, p. 37; CSM II, p. 26). I give
references to Descartes to volume and page number of the collected works edited by Adam and Tannery
(i.e. Descartes 1964–1976), abbreviated as AT, and to volume and page number of the English translation
by Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch (i.e. Descartes 1984), abbreviated as CSM.
21 As we see in the upcoming section, mathematical propositions do have a truth value.
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if that were so, then Nieuwentijt’s claim that it is possible to mathematically deduce
false propositions from true abstracted ideas would not make sense. As noted at the
beginning of this section, the propositions that Nieuwentijt takes to be deducible from
true abstracted ideas, but possibly factually false, are propositions that are true ceteris
paribus only. Such propositions cannot be deduced from the implicit judgments that
arise by assuming that these abstracted ideas correspond to features of existing objects.
If, given the truth of these judgments, a proposition is true ceteris paribus only, then this
proposition does not follow from these judgments. Consider, for instance, one of the
toy-examples that Nieuwentijt uses to illustrate his claim. Suppose that a person P can
lift a bar A that weighs thirty pounds, and that another bar B weighs only ten pounds.
According to Nieuwentijt, the proposition P can lift bar B can be deduced from the
true abstracted ideas of person P’s strength, and those of bar A’s and bar B’s weight.
This proposition is certainly true with respect to these abstracted ideas, Nieuwentijt
claims, but because bar B may for instance be burning hot, the proposition may be
factually false (GC, p. 71). Nieuwentijt’s very example shows that the proposition P
can lift bar B cannot be deduced from the propositions P has the strength to lift thirty
pounds and bar B weighs ten pounds: it shows that the truth of these propositions does
not guarantee the truth of the conclusion.
When we consider an example in which the phenomenon that Nieuwentijt is actu-
ally interested in occurs, the same issue arises.22 Suppose that a feather falls from a
hundred-meter-high tower, and that the gravitational acceleration on earth is exactly
9.8 m/s2. Nieuwentijt would say that the proposition the feather reaches the ground in
4.52 s can be deduced from the abstracted ideas of the feather’s distance to the earth
and the earth’s gravitation, even though it is probably false of the real feather. Again,
the example itself shows that the proposition the feather reaches the ground in 4.52 s
cannot be deduced from the propositions the gravitational acceleration on earth is
exactly 9.8 m/s2 and the feather falls from a hundred-meter-high tower.
One might think that the issue can be resolved by taking it to be Nieuwentijt’s
view that true abstracted ideas themselves are true ceteris paribus only.23 This is
how Ducheyne (2017b, pp. 289–290) understands Nieuwentijt’s position. If one reads
Nieuwentijt in this way, one can argue, for instance, that the conclusion of our feather-
example is deduced from the proposition objects falling near the earth’s surface are
accelerated with exactly 9.8 m/s2. This proposition is true ceteris paribus only. Com-
binedwith the proposition the feather falls from a hundred-meter-high tower, it allows
us to deduce the conclusion the feather reaches the ground in 4.52 s. This solution
seems attractive, but it actually amounts to an uncharitable reading of Nieuwentijt’s
project. Nieuwentijt introduces his notion of an abstracted idea, and his distinction
between factual truth and truth with respect to abstracted ideas, to account for what
we call the ceteris paribus character of scientific claims. If true abstracted ideas would
themselves be true ceteris paribus only, in Nieuwentijt’s eyes, then this would deprive
these ideas of any explanatory value. Nieuwentijt’s point would be that scientific
22 Nieuwentijt gives several examples of scientists who admit that their claims are false, or only true if
we abstract from certain features of the studied phenomena (e.g. GC, pp. 56–57, 64–70). Unfortunately,
Nieuwentijt does not tell us which abstracted ideas he takes the scientists in his examples to reason from.
For this reason, I do not discuss one of his own examples.
23 I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection.
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claims are true ceteris paribus, because they are deduced from ceteris paribus truths.
We should not interpret Nieuwentijt in this way, unless we have good reasons for doing
so. In fact, there is a good reason to deny that this is Nieuwentijt’s view. Nieuwentijt
expresses that a proposition is true ceteris paribus by stating that it is true with respect
to abstracted ideas, but possibly factually false. For propositions, Nieuwentijt distin-
guishes between factual truth and truth with respect to abstracted ideas, but he makes
no such distinction for abstracted ideas themselves. Abstracted ideas are simply true
or false, it seems.
As true abstracted ideas are simply true, and not just true ceteris paribus, we have no
way tomake sense ofNieuwentijt’s claim that it is possible to deduce false propositions
from true abstracted ideas ifwe assume that deducing propositions from true abstracted
ideas consists in deducing propositions from true propositions or judgments. As we
see in the upcoming sections, deducing propositions from ideas is indeed something
different.
3 Deducing propositions in puremathematics
To understand what it means, in mixed mathematics, to mathematically deduce a
proposition from abstracted ideas according to Nieuwentijt, we should first consider
what it means, in pure mathematics, to mathematically deduce propositions from bare
ideas. Nieuwentijt characterizes reasoning in pure mathematics as the examination
and comparison of such ideas:
[W]hat do they [i.e. mathematicians] say reasoning is other, but the examina-
tion [beschouwen] of Ideas, both [soo] separately in their properties, and [als] in
comparison [vergelykinge] with one another? And thus noting, what one expe-
riences [ondervint] every time [telkens] from his Examination of these Ideas?24
(GC, p. 18)
To understand Nieuwentijt’s characterization, we need to clarify what bare ideas are.
To do this, and to get a better understanding of Nieuwentijt’s notion of an abstracted
idea later on, we take a look at Descartes’s distinction between formal and objective
reality, and his use of the term ‘idea’. In the Meditations, Descartes distinguishes
between two types of being or reality: formal and objective reality. Entities that really
exist have formal reality. Objective reality forms a lower type of reality that pertains to
entities that have reality in our minds as the intentional objects of our ideas (Chappell
1986, pp. 186–188; 1997, p. 120;Nolan 1997, pp. 174–176;Ayers 2000, p. 1067).25 An
entity that has objective being in our minds may or may not have what Chappell (1986,
p. 188) calls a formally existing “counterpart” (cf. Chappell 1997, p. 120; Nolan 1997,
p. 175). The intentional object of our idea of a hippogriff, for instance, has objective
reality, but as hippogriffs do not exist, it has no formally existing counterpart (cf.
24 “[W]at seggen sy dat het redeneren anders is, als het beschouwen der Denkbeelden, soo afsonderlyk
in hare eigenschappen, als in vergelykinge met malkander? En dus op te letten, wat men telkens uit dese
syne Beschouwingen deser Denkbeelden ondervint?”.
25 That Descartes regards objective reality as a lower form of reality becomes clear from AT VII,
pp. 102–103; CSM II, p. 75. See Nolan (1997, p. 176), cf. Chappell (1986, p. 187).
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Chappell 1986, p. 188). The intentional object of an idea of the sun, on the other
hand, has objective being and does have a formally existing counterpart: the real sun
(Chappell 1986, pp. 187–188).26
NowDescartes regards the intentional object of an idea, i.e. the entity that has objec-
tive reality, and the idea itself as one and the same thing (Nolan 1997, pp. 175–176;
Chappell 1986, pp. 186–188; Ayers 2000, pp. 1067–1068). As Descartes says in the
First Replies:
[T]he idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect – not of course
formally existing, as it does in the heavens, but objectively existing, i.e. in the
way in which objects normally are in the intellect (AT VII, 102; CSM II, 75).27
In other words: ideas themselves are the entities that have objective being according
to Descartes. Our idea of the sun is the objectively existing sun we represent in our
minds. More precisely, what Descartes calls ideas taken “objectively” (AT VII, 8;
CSM II, 7) are such objective entities (Chappell 1986, pp. 186–188; 1997, p. 120;
Nolan 1997, pp. 175–176; Ayers 2000, pp. 1066–1068; cf. Patterson 2008, p. 218).
In the Preface to the Meditations, Descartes distinguishes between what he calls an
idea taken “materially”, which forms an “operation of the intellect” (AT VII, 8; CSM
II, 7), and the idea taken “objectively”, which is the object that is represented by the
idea taken materially (ibid.). The intentional object of the idea taken materially is the
idea taken objectively, and this idea is an entity with objective being (Chappell 1986,
pp. 184–188; 1997, p. 120; Patterson 2008, p. 218; Ayers 2000, pp. 1067–1068).28
What Descartes describes as “the sun itself existing in the intellect” is the idea of
the sun taken objectively (Chappell 1986, pp. 186–188; 1997, p. 120; Ayers 2000,
pp. 1067–1068; cf. Nolan 1997, pp. 175–176).29
When Nieuwentijt speaks of bare ideas, he uses the term ‘idea’ in the same way
Descartes does when he speaks of ideas taken objectively.30 The bare ideas on the
basis of which Nieuwentijt takes pure mathematicians to reason are ideas of math-
ematical objects, such as triangles and circles. He identifies these bare ideas with
the mathematical objects they represent. The bare idea of a triangle is a triangle for
26 I adopt Chappell’s example here.
27 See also Chappell (1986, p. 187); Patterson (2008, p. 218); Ayers (2000, p. 1067); cf. Nolan (1997,
p. 176).
28 See Chappell (1986) for an extensive discussion of the relation between ideas taken objectively and
ideas taken materially, and esp. pp. 184–194 for helpful analysis of Descartes’s notion of an idea taken
objectively.
29 Note that there are two representative relations at work in Descartes. Within the mind, the idea taken
materially represents an idea taken objectively (Chappell 1986, pp. 191–192). The idea taken objectively
may, in turn, represent an entity external to the mind, which is its formally existing counterpart (Chappell,
1986, pp. 192–193). Cf. Ayers (2000, pp. 1066–1069). See e.g. also Smith (2010, esp. pp. 246–252) for
helpful discussion of Descartes’s two relations, and for some interpretative issues related to them. Thanks
to an anonymous reviewer for critical comments regarding this issue.
30 In what follows, I do not consider whether Nieuwentijt was factually influenced byDescartes, or whether
he picked up his somewhat Cartesian vocabulary from other sources. Vermij (1991, pp. 7–12; cf. pp. 42–50)
has pointed out that although Nieuwentijt rejects Cartesianism in his mature works, he probably held
Cartesian views in his early life (see also Petry 1979, pp. 2–3; Ducheyne 2017a, section 2; b, pp. 275–276).
Vermij (1991, p. 152) also points out that Nieuwentijt seems to have possessed some of Descartes’s work,
but not many other speculative works.
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Nieuwentijt.31 When Nieuwentijt claims that pure mathematicians study bare ideas,
his point is that the entities that pure mathematics studies, mathematical objects, have
objective reality.32 The ideas that pure mathematics studies are “bare”, because pure
mathematicians do not verify whether they have formally existing counterparts. As
there may not be formally existing triangles, circles etc., mathematical objects are
nothing but ideas.33
The bare ideas on the basis ofwhich puremathematicians reason are objectively real
mathematical objects, so when pure mathematicians examine and compare bare ideas,
they examine and compare mathematical objects, according to Nieuwentijt. Nieuwen-
tijt takes us to have a special type of “experience” (ondervinding) that enables us
to determine the properties of our ideas. Nieuwentijt normally uses the term “expe-
rience” to refer to effects of existing objects on our bodies or minds (see esp. GC,
p. 120). Ordinary experience allows us to determine whether propositions that speak
of existing objects are true (e.g. GC, p. 130). The special experience we have of
our ideas, by contrast, allows us to determine whether propositions that speak of our
ideas are true (e.g. GC, pp. 20–21).34 Nieuwentijt uses the Cartesian term “clear
and distinct understanding” (klaar en distinct begrip) for the experience we have of
our ideas (e.g. GC, p. 19). According to Nieuwentijt, we know that a proposition
that speaks of our ideas is true if we clearly and distinctly understand it to be true
(GC, pp. 20–21).
According to Nieuwentijt, pure mathematicians work in the following way. First,
they “describe” (beschryven) their bare ideas in definitions. Then they determine the
properties of these ideas, and compare them to others (GC, p. 11). This leads them to
“deduce” (afleiden) propositions: they express by means of language which proper-
ties they find in their ideas. If it is immediately clear to everyone that the ideas that
a proposition speaks of have the properties the proposition ascribes to them, then the
proposition forms an axiom (ibid.).35 If this is not immediately clear, the proposi-
31 This becomes clear from the fact that Nieuwentijt tends to say that pure mathematics studies bare ideas,
rather than the objects of bare ideas (e.g. GC, p. 27). He also tends to say that purely mathematical propo-
sitions make claims about bare ideas (e.g. GC, pp. 21–22). There are some passages in which Nieuwentijt
seems to distinguish between bare ideas and their objects (e.g. GC, p. 6). I take it that Nieuwentijt regards
bare ideas and the objects of bare ideas as one and the same entity. Nieuwentijt does not make this explicit.
He does, however, twicemention themathematician Raphsonwho, as Nieuwentijt reads him, claims that the
objects of pure mathematics are “beings of reason” (Redenwesens) (GC, p. 23, cf. p. 3), and who believes
that such beings and our ideas of them are “one and the same” (GC, p. 3, cf. pp. 23–24).
32 Ducheyne (2017a, section 2) makes the same observation. Chappell (1997) and Nolan (1997) have
argued that Descartes regards mathematical objects as (innate) ideas taken objectively.
33 Note that even on conceptualist readings of Descartes such as those of Chappell (1997) and Nolan
(1997), this is not exactly Descartes’s view. For Nieuwentijt, the status of a mathematical idea does not
fundamentally differ from that of a hippogriff. For Descartes it does. Cf. also Petry (1979, p. 5).
34 Nieuwentijt uses the same word for the two types of experiences on purpose (see GC, p. 92). He does
emphasize, however, that the two types of experience are quite different (GC, pp. 120–122).
35 As Nieuwentijt himself puts it: “If now that which they [i.e. mathematicians] deduce as a conclusion [tot
een besluit afleiden] from these properties (either examined in themselves, or being compared to others),
is, to someone who understands the words by means of which they express this [conclusion], immediately
clear, and anyone experiences [ondervint] this to take place such and in the same way in his Ideas, then they
[i.e. mathematicians] express this in a proposition [voorstel]. Which they therefore call Axiom [Axioma]
[…]” (GC, p. 11).
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tion requires a proof. In a proof, mathematicians “show, how anyone should lead his
thoughts, to be able to experience these proposed [voorgestelde] properties of this Idea
[…] in his Ideas as well […]”36 (GC, p. 12). In such a proof, they make use of the
definitions, the axioms, and the already demonstrated theorems (ibid.).37
Nieuwentijt’s characterization of the working method of pure mathematics shows
that when we deduce propositions from bare ideas, we do not so much deduce them
from other propositions.38 Rather, we report the experiences we have of our ideas.
The pure mathematician comes to “experience” (i.e. clearly and distinctly understand)
whether the objects that a mathematical proposition speaks of have the properties that
that proposition assigns to them. If he can make every other person experience this as
well, he deduced the proposition from the ideas. Both axioms and theorems count as
deduced from bare ideas in this sense.39 In the next section, we see that Nieuwentijt’s
conception of mathematical reasoning helps understand how he can claim that it is
possible to deduce false propositions from true ideas.
4 Deducing propositions from abstracted ideas
According to Nieuwentijt, reasoning on the basis of the abstracted ideas that mixed
mathematicians form of existing objects is exactly the same activity as reasoning on
the basis of bare ideas (GC, p. 48). Both in pure and in mixed mathematics, to reason
on the basis of ideas means: to examine and compare them (GC, pp. 48, 50). To
understand what it means to mathematically deduce a proposition from abstracted
ideas, we therefore need to determine how Nieuwentijt conceives of abstracted ideas.
One straightforward possibility is that Nieuwentijt regards abstracted ideas, just like
bare ideas, as mathematical objects that have objective being in our minds. Abstracted
ideas could be mathematical objects that represent quantitative features of existing
objects. AlthoughNieuwentijt certainly regards some abstracted ideas asmathematical
objects,40 this interpretation does not work for Nieuwentijt’s general use of the notion
of an abstracted idea. First of all, not all abstracted ideas represent quantitative features
in Nieuwentijt’s eyes. We can for instance form an abstracted idea of the material an
object is made of (see GC, p. 74). Moreover, the interpretation does not square with
Nieuwentijt’s characterization of an abstracted idea:
[T]hose [ideas that] show one ormore Properties of a Thing (but not, however, all
Properties), they [i.e. the philosophers] callAbstractae or subtracted: Therefore,
because from the whole Being or from all of the Properties that are in the Thing,
36 “tonen […] hoe yder syne gedagten leiden moet, om de selfde voorgestelde eigenschappen van dit
Denkbeelt […] ook in syne Denkbeelden te kunnen ondervinden […]”.
37 Nieuwentijt’s characterization of a mathematical proof is similar to Descartes’s. See Hacking (1980)
and Nolan (2005) for discussions of Descartes’s views on proof.
38 Although Nieuwentijt does suggest that it may be possible to logically deduce all theorems in pure
mathematics from the axioms (GC, p. 213).
39 That axioms are deduced from bare ideas according to Nieuwentijt becomes clear from the passage cited
in footnote 35.
40 This becomes clear from GC, p. 49, cf. p. 25.
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only these are as if Subtracted in thought. Which ones alone one then takes into
account, without attending to other Properties of the Thing (GC, p. 45).41
When we form an abstracted idea, we literally “subtract” an object’s property and
consider it in isolation, according to Nieuwentijt. This suggests that abstracted ideas
are what we might call ‘objective properties’42: objective counterparts of properties
of formally existing objects. This would explain why Nieuwentijt often speaks of
“subtracted properties”, rather than of subtracted or abstracted ideas (e.g. GC, pp. 63,
65, 69, 71, 74). The fact that some ofNieuwentijt’s abstracted ideas formmathematical
objects does not conflict with this interpretation. An objective triangle could, for
instance, be regarded as an objective counterpart of an existing object’s shape. The
interpretation explains, moreover, how Nieuwentijt can claim that it is possible for
abstracted ideas to “roughly coincide” (eenigsints over een te komen) (GC, p. 25)
with bare ideas of mathematical objects. Nieuwentijt states, for instance, that the
“Subtracted Idea of the orbits of the Planets around the Sun”43 (GC, p. 61) was long
thought to be “similarly shaped to that of a Circle”44 (ibid.), whereas it actually “more
closely resembled that of an […] Ellipse […]”45 (GC, p. 62). Arguably, an objective
orbit could resemble an objective ellipse.
Although the proposed interpretation accounts for most of the textual evidence, it
does not fully explain Nieuwentijt’s use of the notion of an abstracted idea. In Sect. 2,
we introduced Nieuwentijt’s notion of truth “with respect to” abstracted ideas. We
noted that propositions that are deduced from abstracted ideas of existing objects are
certainly true with respect to these ideas, according to Nieuwentijt, but possibly false
of the existing objects they represent. In our earlier feather-example, the proposi-
tion the feather falls to the ground in 4.52 s would certainly be true with respect to
abstracted ideas, in Nieuwentijt’s eyes, but probably false of the actual feather. On
the interpretation advanced so far, it is difficult to make sense of Nieuwentijt’s notion
of truth with respect to an abstracted idea. Nieuwentijt suggests that propositions that
are true with respect to abstracted ideas are propositions that make true claims about
these abstracted ideas (e.g. GC, pp. 117, 118, 213). He suggests that a proposition that
makes a claim about existing objects can be regarded in twoways. It can be regarded as
making a claim about the object, or as making a claim about an abstracted idea of that
object.46 A proposition that speaks about existing objects is true if these objects “are
such, as the Proposition or Conclusion says that they are”47 (GC, p. 51, cf. p. 117).
When we ask whether a proposition that speaks of abstracted or “subtracted” ideas
41 “[D]ie [denkbeelden die] een of meer Eigenschappen van een Saak (dog egter niet alle Eigenschappen)
vertonen, noemen sy [de Philosophen] Abstractae of afgetrokkene: Daarom om dat van het gehele Wesen
of van alle de Eigenschappen die in de Saak syn, dese alleen gelyk als met de gedagten Afgetrokken worden.
Welke men dan alleen in aanmerkinge neemt, sonder op andere Eigenschappen van deselve Sake agt te
geven”.
42 I borrow this term from Chappell (1986, p. 190), who notes that we do not only find objective substances
in Descartes, but also objective properties. Cf. Chappell (1997, pp. 120; 122).
43 “het Afgetrokkene Denkbeelt van de wegen der Planeten om de Sonne”.
44 “gelykformig aan dat van een Cirkel”.
45 “meer overeen quam met dat van een […] Ellipsis […]”.
46 This becomes clear, in particular, from GC, pp. 118–119.
47 “soodanig syn, als het Voorstel of Besluit segt dat sy syn”.
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is true, Nieuwentijt says, we ask: “whether these Subtracted Ideas are such in them-
selves, or have such similarities or differences with other Ideas?”48 (GC, p. 117). It
is difficult to see how a proposition that makes a claim about an existing object could
also make a claim about an idea that forms an objective property, let alone a true claim.
To make sense of Nieuwentijt’s notion of truth with respect to an abstracted idea,
it seems that we must assume that he regards these ideas as copies of existing objects
themselves. If the proposition the feather falls to the ground in 4.52 s is to make a
claim about an abstracted idea of a feather, for instance, that idea must be a kind of
feather. An objective copy of a feather would be a kind of feather. An objective feather
cannot have properties in the way a physical feather does, but presumably Nieuwentijt
believes that it can have such properties objectively.49 It wouldmake some sense, then,
to say that an idea that forms an objective copy of a feather has the property falls to
the ground in 4.52 s, and that the proposition the feather falls to the ground in 4.52 s
makes a true claim about that idea.
The tension in Nieuwentijt’s use of the notion of an abstracted idea can be resolved
if we take it to be his view that one and the same abstracted idea can function both as
an objective copy of a property of an object, and as an objective copy of that object as a
whole. An abstracted idea that forms a copy of a property of a formally existing object
could also be regarded as an incomplete copy of the object itself. It can be regarded
as an objective counterpart of the formally existing object that is stripped of all but
one, or a few, of that object’s properties. To give an example: Suppose that we form a
perfectly accurate idea of the earth’s shape. Considering Nieuwentijt’s conception of
an idea, this idea would have to be an objective shape that forms a copy of the earth’s
shape.50 This shape cannot only be regarded as an objective property, but also as an
incomplete objective variant of the earth as a whole. It can be regarded as an objective
variant of the earth that is stripped from all of the original earth’s properties, except
for its shape.
Admittedly, there is not much direct evidence for this reading. However, it seems
that we can only make sense of Nieuwentijt’s use of the notion of an abstracted idea
if we assume that he uses it roughly along these lines. If Nieuwentijt’s abstracted
ideas can indeed be regarded as incomplete copies of formally existing objects, then
this explains why he considers it possible to deduce false propositions from true
abstracted ideas. Reasoning in mixed mathematics is the same activity as reasoning in
pure mathematics according to Nieuwentijt, we saw. When we deduce a proposition
48 “of dese Afgetrokken Denkbeelden sodanig in sig selfs syn, of sodanige oveenkomsten of verschillen
hebben met andere Denkbeelden?” Nieuwentijt adds the following clarification to this passage: “that is,
whether there can be such consequences [gevolgen] or Conclusions [Besluiten] Mathematically deduced
from these Subtracted Ideas, as this Proposition says that can happen?” (GC, p. 117). One could argue,
drawing on this remark, that all it means for a proposition to be true with respect to abstracted ideas,
according to Nieuwentijt, is that that proposition can be mathematically deduced from these ideas. The
abstracted ideas must not have the properties that the proposition ascribes to them. This reading does
not square well, however, with the first part of Nieuwentijt’s characterization of what it means to be true
with respect to an abstracted idea. As becomes clear later, moreover, Nieuwentijt’s clarificatory remark is
perfectly understandable on the interpretation advanced here.
49 See also Chappell (1986, pp. 188–190) for a discussion of this issue in Descartes.
50 According toNieuwentijt, an abstracted idea of an object can form an adequate or “complete” (volkomen)
idea of one or several of that object’s properties (GC, p. 45).
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from abstracted ideas, we report which properties we “experience” in those ideas. As
Nieuwentijt says:
When now the Examining of these Factual [Sakelyke] Ideas as such, and com-
pared with others makes the Examiner, if he pays sufficient attention, experience
one Property or another (it may be a similarity, or a difference in these Ideas),
[and] when then he expresses that what he experiences by way of Proposing
[Voorstellen] (Propositio or Enunciato), he is said to form a Conclusion [een
Besluit te maken].
It will be unnecessary to show here more extensively, that the forming of conclu-
sions, in Factual Mathematics happens in the same way from the Factual Ideas,
as in the Speculative Mathesis from the bare Ideas (GC, p. 50).51
In pure mathematics, a proposition is deducible from bare ideas if it can be established
that it makes a true claim about these ideas, according to Nieuwentijt. A proposi-
tion is deducible from abstracted ideas if it can be established that it makes a true
claim about these abstracted ideas. When we ask whether a proposition is true with
respect to abstracted ideas, Nieuwentijt states, we ask “[…] whether there can be such
consequences [gevolgen] and Conclusions [Besluiten] Mathematically deduced, as
this Proposition says that can happen?”52 (GC, p. 117). In other words: the question
whether a proposition can be deduced from abstracted ideas amounts to the question
whether that proposition makes a true claim about these ideas. Just as in pure math-
ematics, this is determined through the “experience” (GC, p. 50) we have of these
ideas: through clear and distinct understanding (GC, pp. 64, 117, 129).
In Sect. 2, we saw that, according to Nieuwentijt, a proposition that is deduced from
an abstracted idea would certainly be true of the formally real object of that idea, if that
object would have no properties other than those represented by the abstracted idea. If
Nieuwentijt’s abstracted ideas form objective copies of formally existing objects that
have some, but not all of these objects’ properties, then there will be propositions that
can be shown to be true of these abstracted ideas, but that may be false of the formally
real objects they represent. The proposition the feather falls to the ground in 4.52 s
of our example, for instance, can be shown to be true of an objective variant of the
feather that has no properties but its distance to the earth. Considering Nieuwentijt’s
conception of mathematical reasoning, such propositions count as deducible from the
abstracted ideas.
51 “Gelyk nu het Beschouwen deser Sakelyke Denkbeelden in sig selfs, en in vergelyking met anderen aan
den Beschouwer, als hy behoorlyk op let, de eene of andere Eigenschap (het sy overeenkomst, of verschil
in dese Denkbeelden) doet ondervinden, [en] wanneer hy als dan het geen hy aldus ondervint, by manier
van Voorstellen (Propositio of Enunciato) uitdrukt, wordt hy gesegt een Besluit te maken.
Het sal onnodig syn hier uitvoeriger aan te toonen, dat het besluiten maken, in de Sakelyke Wiskunde
op deselve wyse uit de Sakelyke Denkbeelden geschiet, als in de Speculative Mathesis uit de bloote
Denkbeelden”.
52 “[…] of ‘er uit dese Afgetrokkene Denkbeelden sodanige gevolgen en Besluiten Wiskundig kunnen
afgeleid worden, als dit Voorstel segt dat kan geschieden?”.
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5 Logical reasoning versus reasoning from ideas
We began this paper with the observation that mathematically deducing propositions
from ideas cannot be the same activity as logically deducing propositions from other
propositions. A proposition that is mathematically deduced from true abstracted ideas
may be false according to Nieuwentijt, whereas a proposition that is logically deduced
from true premises must be true. We can now explain how the two types of reasoning
differ.
Nieuwentijt’s views on logic do not seem fully worked out. Nieuwentijt himself
notes that the topic actually does not fall within the scope of his work (GC, p. 204).
He only discusses it because he fears that he may have given the impression that “the
Mathematicians” (ibid.) even require empirical verification of propositions that are
deduced from factually true propositions via.
[…] Arguments [Sluitreden] or Syllogisms, which one finds with the Logicians:
of which the Conclusions are always taken to be True, if only the Praemissae or
Preceding propositions are Truly and Lawfully stated according to the Rules of
Logic (GC, pp. 204–205).53
Nieuwentijt seems to adopt his views on logic somewhat blindly from the Port-Royal
Logic.54 In Logic or the Art of Thinking, Arnauld and Nicole seek to provide a general
criterion for determining the validity of syllogisms. According to Arnauld and Nicole,
a syllogism is valid if one of the premises “contains” the conclusion, and if the other
premise “shows that […] the containing proposition actually does contain the one we
wish to prove” (LAT , III, 10, p. 163).55 Arnauld and Nicole distinguish between the
intension or “comprehension” of an idea, and its extension. The intension of an idea
consists of “the attributes contained in an idea” (LAT , I, 6, p. 39). The extension consists
of “the subjects to which the idea applies” (LAT , I, 6, p. 40). Whether a proposition
contains another proposition is determined, according to Arnauld and Nicole, by the
extensions and the intensions of the terms in these premises.56
Nieuwentijt adopts the Port-Royal logicians’ characterization of a valid syllogism.
For Nieuwentijt, a logical inference is composed of two premises and a conclusion. In
a valid inference, the conclusion is deduced from one of the two premises. The other
premise serves to help one see that the conclusion can be deduced from the first.57
According to Nieuwentijt, a proposition q can be deduced from another proposition p
if “nothing is said” (niets gesegt word, GC, p. 206) by q that is not already said by p.
Put differently, q can be deduced from p if p “comprehends” (begrypt, GC, p. 205) q.
It is not clear to what extent Nieuwentijt adopts the Port-Royal logicians’ concep-
tions of intension and extension. Therefore, it is not entirely clear when a proposition
53 “[…] Sluitredenen of Syllogismi, welke men by de Logici vint: waar van de Besluiten indien maar de
Praemissae ofVoorgaande propositienWaar enWettig na de Regulen der Logica gestelt syn, altyt gehouden
worden Waar te syn”.
54 He refers to “Ars Cogitandi” (GC, p. 208), which must be a Latin translation of this work.
55 I use LAT as abbreviation for Logic or the Art of Thinking and give references to, respectively, book
part, chapter, and page number of the English translation by Buroker (i.e. Arnauld and Nicole 1996).
56 This becomes clear from LAT , III, 10, p. 163.
57 This becomes especially clear from GC, p. 208. See also Nieuwentijt’s examples at GC, pp. 206–207.
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“comprehends” another proposition according to Nieuwentijt. It does not seem to be
Nieuwentijt’s view that this is exclusively determined by themeanings or intensions of
the terms the propositions contain, or at least not in all cases. According toNieuwentijt,
Peter is mortal is deducible from Peter is human, for instance (GC, p. 205). However,
he regards the proposition all humans are mortal as an empirical generalization (GC,
p. 218).58 Although Nieuwentijt himself does not speak of extensions, we can say
that he implicitly takes terms to have something that we could call an extension: a set
of entities to which that term applies. Depending on whether a proposition speaks of
existing objects or of ideas, the extensions of its terms consist of existing objects or of
ideas. It seems that whether a proposition “comprehends” another proposition depends
on the extensions of the terms these propositions contain.59 If this is correct, then this
explains why, according to Nieuwentijt, a proposition that is logically deduced from
true premises must be true as well. We could say that the premises of a logical infer-
ence provide information about certain inclusion and exclusion relations between the
extensions of the terms they contain. If the premises of a logical inference are true
of existing objects, they provide information about relations between sets of existing
objects. If this information allows us to determine the truth of another proposition,
then this proposition must be true of existing objects as well.
Mathematical reasoning on the basis of ideas differs from logical reasoning on the
basis of propositions precisely becausewhatNieuwentijt describes as logical reasoning
does not involve the examination of ideas. Earlier, we saw that when we deduce a
proposition from ideas, we consider whether the proposition makes a true claim about
these ideas. This type of reasoning does not allowus to determinewhether a proposition
is true of existing objects.60 Whether a proposition can be logically deduced from
other propositions, by contrast, is not determined by ideas, but by the logical relations
between the propositions. Logical reasoning does allow us to determine whether a
proposition is true of existing objects: if the premises of a logical inference are true of
existing objects, then so is the conclusion.
Even when we reason logically on the basis of propositions that speak of bare or
abstracted ideas, rather than of existing objects, we do something different than when
we deduce these propositions from the ideas themselves in Nieuwentijt’s eyes, or so
it seems. If a proposition is true of ideas, then propositions that are logically deduced
from that proposition are certainly true of ideas as well, according to Nieuwentijt.61
58 It is not clear whether Nieuwentijt believes that terms have meanings or intensions that allow us to
determine independently from experience that certain propositions can be deduced from each other. There
are some passages that suggest this (see e.g. GC, p. 206, example III). If it is Nieuwentijt’s view that terms
have such intensions, then it seems that these intensions cannot be ideas of the objects that fall under these
terms, or at least no abstracted ideas. If B’s intension allows us to determine that all A are C can be deduced
from all A are B, then B’s intension should allow us to determine that C applies to all of the objects thought
under B. However, abstracted ideas of objects do not allow us to determine this.
59 It may be Nieuwentijt’s view, however, that in some cases the inclusion and exclusion relations between
extensions of terms are determined by their intensions. Cf. the previous footnote.
60 Unlesswe reason on the basis of adequate ideas.However,Nieuwentijt deems it practically impossible for
humans to form adequate ideas of existing objects (GC, pp. 46–47). See also Ducheyne (2007, pp. 704–705;
2017a, section 2; b, p. 290).
61 Nieuwentijt does not make this fully explicit. Before starting his discussion of logical deduction, he
notes that he will not say much about logical inferences regarding “the Ideal” (het Denkbeeldige), because
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When we deduce a mathematical proposition like all equilateral triangles have angles
that equal two straight angles from ideas, we determine its truth value through the
experience we have of these ideas: through clear and distinct understanding. When we
logically deduce this proposition from other propositions, such as from all triangles
have angles that equal two straight angles, no clear and distinct understanding appears
to be involved.62 The same distinction can be made for abstracted ideas.
Because logical reasoning does not involve the examination of ideas, there is another
important difference between the two types of reasoning. Mathematical reasoning on
the basis of ideas allows us to determine whether propositions that make claims about
ideas are true without relying on other propositions, according to Nieuwentijt. Logical
reasoning does not. We can determine that a proposition that speaks of ideas is true
by deducing it from other propositions, Nieuwentijt states, but at some point we must
reach premises whose truth is established without the use of further propositions. For
this reason, pure mathematicians need axioms, he states. Axioms
[…] are taken to be True because of a Clear and distinct understanding or because
of these Experiences in the Ideas alone; and argued by no Inference [uit geen
gevolg]: but by themselves: that is, by this Experience in the understanding (GC,
p. 213).63
Nieuwentijt makes the same point for propositions that make claims about abstracted
ideas. We can establish that a proposition like the feather falls to the ground in 4.52 s
from our earlier example is true of abstracted ideas by logically deducing it from other
propositions that are true of abstracted ideas. However, eventually we must reach
premises whose truth we establish through “[…] the Experiences, which one expe-
riences in these Subtracted Ideas […]”64 (ibid.), Nieuwentijt states. In other words,
at some point we must reach premises that are not deduced from propositions about
abstracted ideas, but from the abstracted ideas themselves.65 Nieuwentijt suggests
that it may be possible to logically deduce all purely mathematical theorems from the
axioms (ibid). However, as at least the truth of the axioms cannot be established by
logical reasoning, logical reasoning alone does not allow us to establish truths about
bare ideas. The same holds for abstracted ideas.
6 Conclusion
Nieuwentijt does not regard logic as a part ofmathematics or vice versa, likeDucheyne
and Petry suggest, and Beth’s suggestion that Nieuwentijt’s position is akin to logicism
Footnote 61 continued
he thinks that his reader will be able to infer this from his discussion of “the Factual” (het Sakelyke) (GC,
p. 205). That this is what we should take to be Nieuwentijt’s point is suggested by GC, pp. 213–214.
62 Nieuwentijt indicates nowhere in his chapter on logic that clear and distinct understanding plays any
role when we logically deduce propositions from other propositions.
63 “[…] om een Klaar en distinct begrip of om dese Ondervindinge in de Denkbeelden alleen voor Waar
aangenomen; en uit geen Gevolg betoogt worden: maar door sig selfs: dat is, door dese Ondervinding in
het verstant”.
64 “[…] de Ondervindinge, welke men in dese Afgetrokkken Denkbeelden ondervint […]”.
65 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this issue.
123
Synthese
is misleading.66 Although Nieuwentijt does not himself speak of such things as logical
truths, his views on logic commit him to the existence of such truths. Propositions of
the form all A’s are B and all B’s are C, so all A’s are C, for instance, should be true
in virtue of logic alone for Nieuwentijt. Such logical truths have a different status than
mathematical truths.
In Nieuwentijt, we implicitly find a distinction that Macbeth (2017) has recently
ascribed to Descartes, namely a distinction between logically and non-logically nec-
essary truths. According to Macbeth, Descartes’s creation doctrine, his claim that
necessary truths are created by God, applies only to non-logically necessary truths.
The negations of logical truths “are absolutely impossible”, Macbeth (2017, p. 19)
claims. Even God could not have made them true. For this reason, logical truths did
not need to be created. Non-logically necessary truths such as mathematical truths
have to be created according to Descartes, precisely because they do not form logi-
cal truths, Macbeth argues. Non-logically necessary truths are true in virtue of rules
that God created, and that could have been created otherwise (Macbeth 2017, esp.
pp. 19–22).67
Because the truth of mathematical propositions does not depend on the factual sit-
uation in the world according to Nieuwentijt, we can say that he regards mathematical
truths as necessary truths. However, mathematical truths do rely on the properties of
our ideas for Nieuwentijt: if our ideas would be different, there would be different
mathematical truths, it seems.68 Mathematical truth has much in common with empir-
ical truth for Nieuwentijt. True empirical propositions express facts about the world,
true mathematical propositions express facts about ideas.
Logical truth differs from mathematical truth in Nieuwentijt’s system, because it
does not rely on our ideas. Nieuwentijt’s discussion of logic shows that he presupposes
that there are specific logical relations between propositions, which make logical
deduction possible. To put it in Wittgensteinian terms: Nieuwentijt assumes that the
world has a certain “logical structure” (TLP, 4.014).69 Logical truths are true in virtue
66 Of course, both pure and mixed mathematicians can make use of logical inferences, and Nieuwentijt
points out at various places that they do (e.g. GC, pp. 106–114).
67 Funkenstein (1975) argues that there is a distinction between logically and non-logically necessary truths
in Descartes as well, but on different grounds.
68 There only seem to be mathematical truths about ideas that we actually have, and not, for instance,
about ideas that we could have in Nieuwentijt’s eyes (I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue).
Nieuwentijt does not seem tomake room in his ontology for such things as non-actual ideas. This means that
different collections ofmathematical truths can be true, depending onwhich ideaswe happen to have formed.
Moreover, although Nieuwentijt is probably unaware of this, it appears to be possible within his philosophy
to have mathematical propositions that are true according to one system of ideas, but false according to
another. Nieuwentijt states that pure mathematics should not accept any propositions as true that contradict
already demonstrated propositions (GC, p. 344). However, it seems that if pure mathematicians would have
started out with different ideas, theymight have demonstrated a collection of truths that conflicts with the set
of truths we happen to have demonstrated. There would also be room in Nieuwentijt’s system, it seems, to
dispute the truth of e.g. the parallel postulate on the ground that we do not clearly and distinctly understand
it to be true (cf. Petry 1979, p. 5, who makes a related point).
It seems to be Macbeth’s (2017) view that non-logically necessary truths are true in virtue of ideas
according to Descartes as well (see pp. 19–21), but in a slightly different way than they are for Nieuwentijt.
69 In referring to Wittgenstein, I refer to the proposition numbers of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,
abbreviated as TLP, and use the Ogden translation (i.e. Wittgenstein 1981).
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of this logical structure alone.Aswe do not rely on ideas in logical deduction according
to Nieuwentijt, logical truth does not rely on ideas in his system either. A proposition
that expresses a logical truth would not, like a true mathematical proposition, express
a fact about our ideas for Nieuwentijt. It would merely “show” (cf. TLP, 6.22; cf.
6.124) the logical structure Nieuwentijt presupposes. As Macbeth describes what she
takes to be Descartes’s position: logical truths “have no content” (2017, p. 19).70 The
fact that Nieuwentijt does not himself recognize that logical truths form a different
category of truths within his system reflects this.
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